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Justification of Legal Change: 
In Search for a Model of Neutrality
Uzasadnienie zmiany prawa. W poszukiwaniu modelu neutralności
ABSTRACT
This paper examines neutrality, understood as a necessary requirement for law’s legitimacy. In 
the conventional, liberal formulation of it, the law must neither favor nor depend on any particular 
conception of the good. Taking into consideration the critique that the principle of neutrality has 
received, from within liberalism as well as from rival perspectives, the authors search for an alterna-
tive. The proposed solution is the Model of Neutrality as Non-Arbitrariness (the MNN), according 
to which the making and application of law must seek equilibrium within different justifying reasons 
that are backing the particular law in question. As such, neutrality under the MNN is conceived as 
a virtue of legislators and judges which allows them to weigh competing justifications in a manner 
that appears as best in a particular case.
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INTRODUCTION
In a democratic state, law is binding on all members of society alike, regardless 
of their political, ethical, religious, or cultural affiliations. Given this universal 
binding force (within a jurisdiction), alongside the unquestionable fact of pluralism 
that marks most societies today, one has every reason to demand that democratic 
law be somehow neutral. In other words, there is a legitimate expectation that law 
helps to reconcile citizens’ different commitments and backgrounds, rather than 
introducing domination of prevailing groups of shared commitments or common 
backgrounds. A liberal response to this demand is the principle of neutrality, accord-
ing to which political power should not be used to impose disputable conceptions 
of the good. One of the most influential formulations of this principle comes from 
R. Dworkin, according to which “political decisions must be, so far as is possible, 
independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value 
to life”.1 Consequently, the law should neither depend on nor favor any particular 
conception of the good. In its most common formulation, the principle of neutrality 
does not require the law to be completely value-neutral, which would be obviously 
self-defeating (isn’t neutrality a value?).2 The requirement is rather that law, being 
grounded in democratic values such as equality or individual autonomy, should not 
enforce views about what is worth pursuing in individual life, so that people are 
“free to pursue their own ends within a general framework of rules that is neutral 
towards these ends”.3
In our view, the liberal principle of neutrality, when scrutinized without bias, 
is far from being immune to critique. Although initially criticized mostly from 
standpoints rival to liberalism,4 it has gradually become contested even among 
liberals themselves.5 In the context of neutrality of law, as opposed to neutrality of 
the state (it is the former that is our main concern), one problem seems particularly 
troublesome. Namely, most laws actually biding in real liberal states do not meet 
the neutrality criterion.6 Of course, there is nothing wrong in delegitimizing the 
law on philosophical grounds. But there must be a point at which a highly abstract 
1 R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, Cambridge–London 1986, p. 191.
2 As A. Patten writes, “A decision to be neutral in some conflict or contest is sometimes based 
on nonneutral reasons”, and thus liberal neutrality might be based on a quite rich set of values such 
as equal respect, or equal moral agency (A. Patten, Equal Recognition: The Moral Foundations of 
Minority Groups, Princeton–Oxford 2014, p. 108). A similar recent defense of liberal neutrality is 
offered by W. Ciszewski (Zasada neutralności światopoglądowej państwa, Kraków 2019).
3 W. Sadurski, Moral Pluralism and Legal Neutrality, Dordrecht 1990, p. 90.
4 M. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy, Cambridge 
1996.
5 M. Kramer, Liberalism with Excellence, Oxford 2017.
6 This is admitted, e.g., by G. Gaus, Liberal Neutrality: A Compelling and Radical Principle, 
[in:] Perfectionism and Neutrality, eds. S. Wall, G. Klosko, Lanhan 2003, p. 157.
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principle loses its relevance to the real world, and that seems to be the case here. If 
regulating almost anything by means of law presupposes some choices about what 
human goods should be pursued,7 and perhaps even the rule of law itself is a form 
of such good,8 then either most laws must be repealed, or their neutrality is, after 
all, unimportant. This becomes particularly obvious when we examine law in its 
“genetic” aspect, in which every new law changes one that came before it.9 Since 
law’s permanent feature is change, and the justification thereof always somehow 
points at the good which it is to bring, then “legal neutrality”, in a liberal form at 
least, seems almost ridiculous.
In this paper, however, we will not push this critique further – in fact, the prin-
ciple of liberal neutrality will neither be defended nor refuted. Instead, our focus 
will be on a basic intuition underlying liberal neutrality, namely, one saying that 
it is immoral to apply means of coercion against other people without sufficient 
justification.10 Considered in itself, this intuition is not rigidly tethered to any 
particular political philosophy, and may be interpreted in different ways, within 
different and rival political and legal theories. For purposes of our inquiry, we may 
call it “intuitive prohibition of arbitrariness”, which is widely shared. For example, 
while M.N.S. Sellers strongly rejects liberal skepticism with regards to finding the 
truth about the good, and thereby develops a kind of perfectionist republicanism, 
he nevertheless acknowledges that people may “find themselves in disagreement 
about what the common good entails” and thus need a procedure or technique 
“for impartially evaluating one’s own views about the common good”.11 Another 
example: despite all his criticism toward liberal neutrality, and despite his natural 
law arguments for human perfection or fulfillment as a legitimate political end, 
J. Finnis tries to sustain what appears as some form of the harm principle, saying 
that human authenticity requires “that one has adopted one’s commitments in 
accordance with one’s own conception of duty”.12 This being historically convergent 
7 As B.Z. Tamanaha compellingly outsets, “It is characteristic of non-instrumental views that the 
content of law is, in some sense, given; that law is immanent; that the process of law-making is not 
a matter of creation but one of discovery; that law is not the product of human will; that law has a kind 
of autonomy and internal integrity; that law is, in some sense, objectively determined” (B. Tamanaha, 
Law as a Means to and End: Threat to the Rule of Law, Cambridge 2006, p. 11). All of these claims 
are more less strongly rejected by the modern liberal view on law – and if law is instrumental, then it 
must presuppose the notion of the aim, and aims are tantamount to goods that are pursued.
8 This is argued by T. Smith, Neutrality Isn’t Neutral: On the Value-Neutrality of the Rule of 
Law, “Washington University Jurisprudence Review” 2011, vol. 4(1).
9 Reference to author’s work – anonymized.
10 Here we paraphrase G. Gaus, op. cit., p. 139.
11 M.N.S. Sellers, Republican Legal Theory, Handmills–New York 2010, p.32.
12 J. Finnis, Duties to Oneself in Kant, [in:] idem, Human Rights and Common Good, Oxford 
2011, p. 67. It may debatable if and in what sense J. Finnis acknowledges the harm principle, but 
at least some scholars read him in this way. See C. Tollefsen, Pure Perfectionism and the Limits of 
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with liberal neutrality, one might say that J. Finnis shares the intuitive prohibition of 
arbitrariness despite rejecting its subsequent development in the form of liberal neu-
trality. One might argue, then, that prohibition of arbitrariness serves as a genuine 
common ground for theories otherwise rival to each other. For instance, numerous 
critical theories, such as these coming from the feminist movement, do implicitly 
acknowledge the intuitive prohibition of arbitrariness when accusing liberalism, 
conservative natural law theory, and others, of not being sensitive enough to iden-
tify and tackle factual coercion that is inherent in gender relations.13 Hence, while 
the principle of liberal neutrality might be legitimately questioned, the underlying, 
intuitive prohibition of arbitrariness can hardly be imagined refutable.
Taking the above into consideration, this paper aims at finding a suitable in-
terpretation of the intuitive prohibition of arbitrariness, as applied to making and 
applying laws. In this sense, we are in search for a model of neutrality, but one 
that is not exclusively liberal and could be shared by a considerable set of rival 
political theories. As a response to these requirements, we propose the Model of 
Neutrality as Non-arbitrariness (hereinafter: the MNN). The explication of the 
MNN proceeds as follows. First (Section I), we identify two different possible 
approaches to law’s neutrality – procedural and content-related.14 Although the 
two approaches may go hand in hand and generally do not exclude each other, we 
set the procedural aspect aside, and seek for a content-related model of neutrality. 
Having in mind the highly doubtful plausibility of liberal neutrality in its “standard” 
formulation, we present our conception as an alternative thereto. Instead of find-
ing a rigid set of democratic values which constitute the (allegedly) neutral basis 
for further justification, we adopt the Open Justification Model (hereinafter: the 
OJM), in which law is perceived as grounded in different (public and non-public) 
justifications. Since the OJM emerges from our recognition of the communitarian 
critique of liberal neutrality, Section II offers a reconstruction of the communitarian 
approach (chiefly represented by A. MacIntyre) to justification of legal change. 
According to this reconstruction, the content of law is always “decoded” from 
the pre-existing social practices and patterns of rationality, and the sustainability 
of new laws depends chiefly on the prudence of the legislator. Finally, Section III 
Paternalism, [in:] Reason, Morality, and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis, eds. J. Keown, R.P. 
George, Oxford 2013, p. 206.
13 K.A. Yuracko, Toward Feminist Perfectionism: A Radical Critique of Rawlsian Liberalism, 
“UCLA Women’s Law Journal” 1995, vol. 6(1), p. 48.
14 This distinction assumes that we are dealing with non-consequential neutrality – it is not the 
consequences of policies or laws that matter, but their basic conditions, intentions, or justification. 
We consider the content-related neutrality as focused on law’s justification. In contrast our approach, 
a defense of the consequentialist view on neutrality may be found in S. Clarke, Consequential Neu-
trality Revivified, [in:] Political Neutrality: A Re-Evaluation, eds. R. Merrill, D. Weinstock, Hound-
mills–New York 2014.
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explicates the MNN, which is considered a genuinely common ground in between 
liberalism and communitarianism, bridged through the open justification. Legal 
neutrality as non-arbitrariness is finally presented as an equilibrium between dif-
ferent possible justifications coming either from public reason (the liberal element) 
or background culture (the communitarian element). As such, neutrality under the 
MNN is conceived chiefly as a virtue of legislators and judges which allows them 
to weigh competing justifications for laws in a manner that appears as the best in 
a particular case.
NEUTRALITY: PROCEDURAL VS. CONTENT-RELATED
As the introductory remarks have hopefully made explicit, some formula of 
non-arbitrariness ought to be found for law, in order to sustain its basic legitimacy. 
By the same token, the idea of neutrality of law should not be abandoned, despite 
criticism: rather, it should be reformulated into a possibly widely acceptable version. 
Insofar as genuine respect for law shared by majority of citizens is to be maintained, 
this appears as a practical necessity. But how can or should it be done?
According to J. Waldron, “There are two different ways we can think about 
law and lawmaking. To put it crudely: we can think of law as partisan, as nothing 
more than the expression in legislative terms of the particular ideology or policies 
of a political party; or we can think of law as neutral, as something that stands 
above party politics, at least in the sense that once passed it ought to command 
the obedience and respect of everyone”.15 Setting Waldron’s own conception of 
neutrality aside we should reflect in more general terms what “law being situated 
above particularistic politics” may mean. Certainly, it may mean liberal neutrali-
ty, but this option has been set aside at the outset. What are the other options? In 
a constitutional regime, law may be perceived as transcending day-to-day politics 
and thus deserving some degree of universal respect by virtue of fulfilling proper 
procedures, first and foremost the constitutional principles and rules. Procedural 
requirements of legislation, of adjudication, and perhaps of public discourse about 
those two, can be perceived as a source of law’s neutrality. To give examples: if 
everyone has a possibility to influence the process of legislation, directly or indirect-
ly; or if proper systems of controlling administrative decisions and court judgements 
by higher courts are in place, one may say that arbitrariness or partisanship of the 
legal processes is diminished. The law is then neutral with regards to personal 
convictions, emotions, or ideological and cultural bias of those who make or apply 
it. Neutrality may be conceived gradable.16 This reading may be called “procedural 
15 J. Waldron, The Law: Theory and Practice in British Politics, London–New York 1990, p. 91.
16 This is compellingly argued by W. Ciszewski (op. cit., pp. 273–280).
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neutrality”, which is commonly considered intelligible and desirable. Alternatively, 
or perhaps on top of that, Waldron’s passage may be read as requiring something 
additional – some form of content-related neutrality. In other words, it is not only 
the procedural correctness that may endow the law with a status of neutrality and 
thus the universal claim to respect, but also the substance of its justification. Under 
this reading, a set of substantive reasons – not necessarily actually provided, but 
at least one that “could be provided for it under certain idealized conditions”17 – 
should allow everyone to believe that law has a sound substantive basis that they 
may accept as not narrowly ideological.
This paper examines the latter possibility (the procedural neutrality being taken 
for granted). As we have seen, however, finding a convincing model of substan-
tive or content-related neutrality is much more demanding than doing this within 
a merely procedural approach. In fact, liberal neutrality is one such attempt, at 
least at the level of constitutional law. For example, J. Rawls’ liberal principle of 
legitimacy says that “our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it 
is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens 
as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse”.18 And although he con-
sidered the very term “neutrality” unfortunate, he claimed that his theory, while 
not procedurally neutral, offers prospects for an overlapping consensus, and thus 
a public, universally acceptable basis for justification.19 In other words, J. Rawls 
argued for some form of content-related neutrality, which may be understood as 
universal acceptability of a political conception which works “from fundamental 
intuitive ideas implicit in the public political culture and abstracting from compre-
hensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines”.20 This vision, however, is 
very close or practically identical to the liberal neutrality which has been considered 
highly problematic.
This paper examines another possibility for a content-related model of neu-
trality. Although our proposal is Rawlsian-inspired, it also departs from J. Rawls 
in a fundamental way (one might say that this is a “subversive” reinterpretation of 
his thought). As we have seen, J. Rawls sought “a neutral ground”, and the public 
acceptability (that is, an acceptability that is universal within a jurisdiction) was 
a necessary condition for neutrality. The solution we propose is based on the OJM, 
considered as an alternative to the traditional liberal principle of public justification. 
According to the OJM (which was originally conceived as a model of justifying 
legal change): “Legal change is justified when each citizen has a sufficient, con-
17 J. Kis, State Neutrality, [in:] The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, eds. 
M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajo, Oxford 2012, p. 319.
18 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York 1996, p. 137.
19 Ibidem, p. 191.
20 Ibidem, p. 192.
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tent-related reason to obey it, seeing it as not merely arbitrary but justifiable to 
a minimally sufficient extent”.21
The reason for introducing the OJM into law is the following: when examined 
from a dynamic or genetic point of view, law appears to be marked by change, 
not as an accidental, but as its permanent and recurrent feature. As we already 
mentioned, legal changes are being justified by appeal to different aims or goods 
that are fundamentally grounded not only in public reasons, but also in divergent 
comprehensive (political and non-political) conceptions. And although one could 
argue that it simply entails that law may never be neutral in the content-related sense, 
the OJM suggests otherwise. Namely, the law can be neutral (or non-arbitrary) 
insofar as the divergent reasons for it are properly weighted, or remain in equilib-
rium. When this is the case, one may have a good reason to accept or obey laws 
he does not fully endorse. “Just as courtesy or respect makes us accept invitations 
to gatherings we have neither interest nor delight in attending, open justification 
allows and requires us to accept laws which fail to meet our own well-considered 
criteria for just or optimal law”.22
The OJM, as well the approach to neutrality that in our view stems from it, 
is developed as a result of interaction between liberalism and its communitarian 
critique. According to communitarianism, political community, and the common 
good (understood substantially), constitute the primary source of law’s justification. 
The law is perceived as rooted in long-lasting traditions of a concrete society, its 
practices and normative claims that may be decoded from these practices and tra-
ditions. In the communitarian approach (understood as a general model, opposed 
to the liberal account) a legal change is justified only if it follows some change 
in the latter spheres. The OJM offers a synthetic approach, namely, one assuming 
that the community practices and public justifiability which stands for the liberal 
element, are equally important determinants of democratic law, and should remain 
in equilibrium. A change in the law under the OJM is understood as a result of 
an interplay between those two spheres, each having an independent justificatory 
power. In order to make it more explicit, we must now offer a reconstruction of 
the communitarian approach legal change.
21 M. Rupniewski, Public Reason, Background Culture, and the Justification of Legal Change, 
[in:] The Philosophy of Legal Change, eds. M. Chmieliński, M. Rupniewski, London–New York 
2020, p. 36.
22 Ibidem.
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LAW AS CONFIRMATION: THE COMMUNITARIAN RESPONSE TO 
LIBERAL NEUTRALITY
A natural rejoinder to the contractualist model of public justification (and liberal 
neutrality inherent to it) comes from communitarianism, understood as a rehabil-
itation of the political whole, as something more than a simple sum of individual 
parts comprising it. The general communitarian model we have in mind does not 
consist simply in endorsing the priority of the common good over individual rights, 
as social holism could be understood (which is why communitarians themselves 
find the label “communitarianism” misleading23). Rather, communitarians challenge 
the contract-liberal vision of autonomy of a moral or economic agent (isolated from 
other agents). What is even more important from the point of view of this paper, 
communitarians reject the idea that public institutions can be justified in a way 
which is detached from substantial conception of the good life, or cultural patterns 
of rationality. Consequently, they tend to challenge the notion of “abstract-rational 
will” and “rational-universal procedure” underlying liberal neutrality. As commu-
nitarians argue, institutions should be determined by a substantial common good 
which is somehow set by the historical and cultural traditions; and these traditions 
are the ultimate source of rationality itself.
Once liberal neutrality is rejected, what remains as a possible model of law’s 
justifiability, according to communitarianism? The general answer is the following: 
law is justifiable (always within a concrete legal community) when it follows the 
pre-existing social practices and the conception of the good that a prudent legislator 
is allegedly able to “decode” from these practices.24 Such interpretation may be 
found in A. MacIntyre’s views on human rationality. According to him, the idea of 
Cartesian, a priori rational mind should be rejected. Rather, human mind is always 
“informed as a result of its engagement with objects”,25 that is, always interacts 
with concrete-empirical reality. Practical rationality is no different, and thus moral 
standards also must be embedded in real practices that have been going on in 
a concrete society. Those standards, A. MacIntyre seems to claim, have emerged 
within particular traditions, with their genuine modes and patterns of inquiry, ar-
gumentation, and moral apprehension. There is no possibility to “reason out” of 
this context, and therefore every evaluation of a claim, for example, has to be done 
“with an eye to the specific history and character”26 of a tradition that underlies this 
23 M. Sandel, Public Philosophy: Essays on Morality in Politics, Cambridge 2005, pp. 252–260.
24 M. Chmieliński, Legal “Determinism” or/and Legal “Creationism”? Conservative-Commu-
nitarian versus Contractarian Approaches to Legal Change, [in:] The Philosophy of Legal Change…, 
p. 88.
25 A. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Indiana 1988, p. 356.
26 Ibidem, p. 398.
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particular claim. It applies to public reasoning also, so there is no rationality and 
rational standards of public discourse outside of a concrete tradition.
Taking the above for granted, the communitarian model of justifiability of legal 
change would be centered on the notion of “codification”. Saying this, we assume 
that A. MacIntyre’s approach to rationality of law cannot be essentially different 
from the vision of public rationality as such. First of all, one should say that the 
domain of law is a sub-domain of phronēsis, that is, practical wisdom gained in 
a process of learning from within a particular, concrete community.27 Despite 
phronēsis being a virtue of individual persons, the communitarian factor constitutes 
here the main point of reference and the source of normativity. This is what the 
context-dependent nature of rationality inevitably entails. As a consequence, jus-
tification of legal norms must turn out relativized to a particular culture or cultures 
forming a legal community in question. To speak in M. Sandel’s terms – given the 
fact that we are “thickly constituted” and “morally encumbered” people (rather than 
transcendental selves, or citizens having a separate identity as political persons), 
we will always reason within our deep moral beliefs and cultural patterns (which 
famously argued by M. Sandel28). As a result of this, when actors in the public 
domain are deliberating about the laws, exercising their reason, they cannot escape 
being dependent on what is already there in the tradition and culture.
Granted, the “codification” of law, in the sense adopted in this paper, consists 
in translating the pre-existing informal patterns of action such as custom, traditions 
of rational inquiry, or religious rules governing the community into a framework 
of formal normative acts. Such codification is accompanied by the conviction that 
these norms had existed beforehand, and the human legislator only confirms their 
validity for the community by introducing them in a formal way as the law of that 
community. Of course, this does not mean that this is a completely static model. 
Civic debates should be held, and can possibly bring deep changes in the legal 
system. But the debate itself must, by its very nature, follow the historical-cultural 
patterns of rationality, which allows the ratio legis of the subsequent new law be 
already embedded in the consciousness of the community members. Accordingly, 
legal norms which follow shallow, current needs, or respond to rapidly changing 
social situations, are considered unsatisfactory. Therefore, a well-justified change 
should be evolutionary, and new laws, or changes in streams of judicial decisions, 
should be “decoded” from the changing social practices.
27 Ibidem, p. 119.
28 M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge 1983.




Maciej Chmieliński, Michał Rupniewski132
FINDING A GENUINELY COMMON GROUND:  
NEUTRALITY AS NON-ARBITRARINESS
The MNN, as we want to propose it, takes the communitarian arguments about 
the nature of law’s justification into account. To avoid misunderstanding: it is 
a form of recognition of the communitarian standpoint, or of taking it seriously, 
but is not tantamount to adhering to it. Quite to the contrary – we believe that the 
communitarian doubt on the possibility of an independent judgement about one’s 
own culture, leads to serious practical and theoretical problems. On the one hand, 
communitarians do not simply say that law should be perceived as an outcome of 
partisan clashes of different cultural patterns, or as a simple institutionalization 
of the dominating cultural pattern. Rather, they share the intuitive prohibition of 
arbitrariness – for instance, M. Sandel believes that his vision of morally engaged 
debate enhances mutual respect better than liberal neutrality.29 On the other hand, it 
seems very unclear how prohibition of arbitrariness would be grounded and artic-
ulated if such arbitrariness was deeply embedded in the practices of a community 
concerned. It is likewise unclear how the clashes between competing cultures within 
a pluralist society could be resolved.
Taking these theoretical problems as well as practical circumstances of plu-
ralism into consideration, it seems prudent to try to achieve a normative model of 
legal change that could somehow integrate or reconcile both perspectives, i.e. that 
of the social contract, and that of communitarianism. As a response to this, we 
believe that the liberal categories should be rearranged or re-interpreted in order 
to accommodate to the communitarian insistence on the constitutive importance of 
the community practices that influence the public discourse. Only once this is done, 
a widely plausible model of neutrality may be developed. In fact, possibility of 
this arises within liberalism itself, particularly, in Rawlsian political liberalism. As 
already mentioned, however, this requires a modification or supplementation made 
in political liberalism. The criterion of public justifiability should be reinterpreted, 
and this is what is done by the OJM. Let us now explain how this “subversive” 
interpretation of Rawlsian political liberalism works.
As commonly known, J. Rawls believed that developing a political conception 
of justice one should avoid claims to the whole truth (the philosophical truth, so 
to say), in order to assure that all reasonable citizens will be given due respect, 
and will hopefully accept the political principles, regardless of differences in their 
comprehensive views. In order to reconcile the universal validity of the principles 
of (public) justice with particularism of the comprehensive doctrines, J. Rawls 
proposed to split up the culture of a democratic society into two spheres – public 
political culture and the background culture. The former is the culture guided 
29 Idem, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do?, London 2010, p. 268.
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by democratic ideas and principles. The latter is the culture of a pluralistic civil 
society.30 Now, according to J. Rawls, each human individual can be perceived as 
having a twofold identity. On the one hand, as a citizen, one holds a commitment 
to political principles, for example those present in the constitution. On the other, 
as a moral person, one endorses a comprehensive doctrine of some kind – religious 
or secular. A pluralistic society consists of many different communities at one level 
(groups connected by common worldview or aims), and one political-national 
community at the other level, guided by public reason.31 The latter is “the reason of 
equal citizens, who, as a collective body, exercise final political and coercive power 
over one another in enacting laws and amending their constitution”.32 Of course, 
the two spheres are not completely separate – the public institutions do form the 
worldviews that citizens have, and the citizens do form the institutions according 
to the worldviews they have.33
The OJM adheres to this vision of society. The crucial difference with the 
original J. Rawls is that according to him the comprehensive worldviews may 
influence public institutions only insofar as they are consistent with the public 
reason (comprising basic liberties, democratic procedures, constitution, and the 
like). The OJM challenges this, at least as far as legal activity is concerned. It is 
assumed that the background culture which is “the culture of daily life, of its many 
associations: churches and universities, learned and scientific societies, clubs and 
teams, to mention a few”34 is a legitimate source of normativity. After all, not all 
the law comes from public reason, also in J. Rawls’s original view, and members 
of civil society may legitimately claim that their comprehensive views be some-
how pursued by legal means. As J. Rawls writes, “Many if not the most political 
questions”35 do not concern the fundamental matters of public reason – issues such 
as funding art, or protecting certain areas of the country as national parks, or rules 
of building law, do not directly involve public justifiability.
30 J. Rawls, Political…, p. 443.
31 Interestingly enough, there is a communitarian aspect to it, somehow tacitly admitted by 
J. Rawls himself. As he writes, the institutions rest upon “public political culture itself, including its 
main institutions and the historical traditions of their interpretation, as the shared fund of implicitly 
recognized basic ideas and principles” (ibidem, p. 393). In this respect, J. Rawls breaks up with (or at 
least considerably transforms) the Enlightenment tradition of the social contract as a transcendental 
idea, and relies on a political and legal culture of a democratic (pluralist) community. And it is not 
only a democratic community taken in the abstract. Sometimes he explicitly refers to his own country, 
e.g. when writing: “We look to ourselves and to our future, and reflect upon our disputes since, let’s 
say, the Declaration of Independence. How far the conclusions we reach are of interest in a wider 
context is a separate question” (idem, Collected Papers, Cambridge–London 1999, p. 306).
32 Idem, Political…, p. 214.
33 Ibidem, pp. 168–173.
34 Ibidem, p. 14
35 Ibidem, p. 214.
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The OJM takes this thought even more seriously. It assumes that “different 
communities forming the society’s background culture have their own normative 
and cultural traditions and they are entitled to introduce them into laws”.36 In cases 
in which the regulated subject matter is not directly connected to constitutional 
essentials, and remains within their boundaries, the situation is clear: comprehensive 
views are fully legitimate sources of justification of a legal change. From the per-
spective of adherents to a particular comprehensive doctrine, it is simply a pursuit 
of what they consider the (common) good. For other citizens (opponents), while 
such legislation may fail to realize the good, it is nevertheless of some value. First, 
it pursues something of importance for the supporters, and the virtue of citizenship 
requires the opponents to take that into account. Second – and more importantly – 
the new law should be perceived as justified in a non-arbitrary manner. Even after 
serious debates, or perhaps all the more thereafter, the legislation may appear de-
fective to its opponents. But at the same time they have every reason, and perhaps 
even a duty, to acknowledge a genuine engagement of the supporters. If the latter 
is really the case then even a defective legislation is something more than just an 
arbitrary collective want or an uncoordinated, unreasonable “efflorescence” of law.
In case of constitutional essentials, the picture is different. The OJM affirms 
that these constitutional matters are governed by public (and non-comprehensive) 
reasons, which enjoy certain priority over the comprehensive views present in 
the background culture. However, the role of background culture is a little more 
subtle than simply giving way to public reasons. As the OJM assumes, the general 
ideals comprising a public reason of a given community are subject to constantly 
evolving interpretation. As K. Greenawalt notices, “people with certain inclinations 
are highly likely to develop different views over time about specific subjects as 
a culture and perception of values develop”.37 As both this passage and the com-
mon-sense observation of legal activities suggest, this is not a process that takes 
place in a vacuum, or within public reason alone. Rather, it is the lively “organism” 
of different formal and informal forums and institutions that result in these changes 
of perception. Therefore, background culture and public reason cannot be perceived 
differently but in a constant interplay.
Taking the above into consideration, our approach to neutrality – the MNN – 
can be presented as seeking a synthesis of the contractarian and the communitarian 
thinking, making a way for the genuine common ground between the two. The 
justification of legal change may draw from the two different sorts of sources, name-
ly, from public reason (the political-liberal element), as well as from background 
culture (the communitarian element). The particulars depend on circumstances. 
For instance, when deciding on heritage monument protection, the justification 
36 M. Rupniewski, op. cit., p. 40.
37 K. Greenawalt, The Realms of Legal Interpretation, Oxford 2018, p. 58.
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should draw from background culture mostly, and when deliberating on the issues 
of equality, the justification should be guided by constitutional ideals in the first 
place. Most cases would probably draw on both spheres, since in the real life public 
reasons are always presented at some wider background. In these cases, what the 
MNN requires is the proper weighing of competing reasons. The law may claim 
neutrality only insofar as the content of its justification reflects the acceptance – 
acceptance by the persons concerned, the parties to judicial or legislative process 
– of the justifying reasons. Therefore, a set of reasons that is given as justification 
of a particular law in the process of legislation or law’s application, must some-
how reconcile the competing claims. Granted, non-arbitrariness appears first and 
foremost as a virtue of legislators and judges. It is their job to weigh reasons, and 
if they do it well, one may say that they have done it neutrally. As a consequence, 
one should say that neutrality as non-arbitrariness is, or should be, an important 
element of the ethos of judges and legislators in a democratic state.
Although this paper has developed a theory, and there is no space for a detailed 
case study, it seems expedient to briefly illustrate the MNN with an example. An 
instructive one seems to be national legislations, introduced in most European 
countries (for instance, France, Germany, Poland) which concern special protection 
of rural land, including strict limitations imposed on farmland trade. This was ap-
proved, and to some extent triggered, by the European Union. In one of the recent 
resolutions of the European Parliament, we read that “whereas land is an increas-
ingly scarce resource, which is non-renewable, and is the basis of the human right 
to healthy and sufficient food, and of many ecosystem services vital to survival, 
and should therefore not be treated as an ordinary item of merchandise”,38 and 
therefore the member states should enhance their protective measures. The member 
states have done this, accordingly to their exclusive competence in this area of law.
From the perspective adopted in this paper, such protective legal solutions are 
strictly connected to the communitarian and (classical) republican assumption of 
protecting the common good, manifesting itself in specific structure of national 
agriculture. As such, it certainly does not meet the requirements of liberal neutrality 
– the legislation seems to presuppose not only economic/ecologic efficiency, but 
also the substantive value connected to the specific “life style” of family farming.39 
To the contrary, according to the MNN, the question of possible neutrality of such 
38 European Parliament Resolution of 27 April 2017 on the state of play of farmland concentration 
in the EU: how to facilitate the access to land for farmers (2016/2141(INI)), P8_TA(2017)0197.
39 The said resolution says that the EU as a whole affirms a “multifunctional agricultural 
model, in which family farms are an important feature” (ibidem, letter A). This is very well observed 
in national law. For instance, according to the Polish Constitution, “the basis of the agricultural system 
of the State shall be the family farm” (Article 23 first sentence of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Poland of 2 April 1997, Journal of Laws 1997, no. 78, item 483, as amended; English translation of 
the Constitution at: www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm [access: 10.02.2019]).
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law remains open. The legislative process, as well as subsequent application of law, 
consists to a large extent in weighing two important legal and political values: the 
liberal the right to private property and of contract on the one hand, and on the other 
the “communitarian”, intrinsic value of maintaining the structure and specificity of 
national agricultural resources. In general, one can say that in these solutions, which 
limit the individual right to free sale of such areas, this is the latter that prevails. 
However, legislator or judge supporting such a protection remains non-arbitrary as 
long as the communitarian justification is reasonably, publically acceptable in the 
concrete liberal-democratic society, and does not completely destroy the right to 
private property (without which the very foundation the liberal-democratic society 
would be threatened). In the majority of European countries, it partially limits only 
the right of free sale of agricultural property, while other rights connected to it are 
left untouched. Therefore, it tends to some kind of equilibrium between constitution-
al individual rights protection and the protection of the substantial, communitarian 
common good and goals. Particular assessments of the level of neutrality, or its 
complete lack, must be left to practical judgement, and to the ethos of judges and 
legislators. The theory is only able to give guidelines to the latter.
The above-presented vision of the MNN, which consists in a dynamic interplay 
between public reason and background culture, seems not only pretty adequate 
to the social reality in modern democracies (as the agriculture example aimed to 
show), but also appears as the best justification of change in the light of the intu-
itive prohibition of arbitrariness. If the relevant elements of background culture 
are taken into consideration in the process of change, then the content of new law 
is likely to achieve social acceptance as a neutrally justified solution. The MNN, it 
seems, pays due respect to the factors such connected to public reason, as well as 
to the cultural commitments and determinants highly valued by communitarians.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we attempted to propose a model of neutral justification of law. 
The point of departure was a recognition of the intuitive prohibition of arbitrariness. 
Taking into consideration the fact that the persistent feature of contemporary legal 
orders is change, and that change is always in one way or another connected to 
the ideological and political agenda, the virtue of neutrality appeared both easily 
questionable and necessary. As we aimed to demonstrate, the MNN, understood 
as a synthesis of contractarianism and communitarianism, provides a compelling 
reconciliation of political-ideological element in law with its neutrality, understood 
as non-arbitrariness. It may also provide a genuinely common ground not only 
between liberal neutrality and communitarian thinking. Speaking more broadly, it 
hopefully articulates the intuitive prohibition of arbitrariness in a form plausible 




Justification of Legal Change: In Search for a Model of Neutrality 137
for many rival political theories. If public reason and background culture remain 
in a reasonable equilibrium in the process of legal change, the result of this change 
may be expected to achieve social acceptance as the properly – and, in a sense, 
neutrally – justified law of the community.
Conceived in this way, non-arbitrariness appears first and for most as a virtue 
of legal actors – a judge or legislator remains neutral in the sense of striving to 
avoid simply taking their personal stance on an issue. Instead, she is trying to grasp 
different justifications of law that appear in the (legislative or judicial) process, 
and then, as impartially as possible, weigh the values these justifications evoke. 
This model of neutrality seems to have a potential of enhancing legitimation of 
law by going beyond mere formalism on the one hand, and avoiding rigidness of 
substantive principles such as liberal neutrality on the other. On the other hand, 
it is pretty demanding of judges and legislators, which makes it another call for 
“Herculeses” in the legal profession.
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ABSTRAKT
W niniejszym artykule analizie poddano zagadnienie neutralności rozumianej jako konieczny 
wymóg legitymacji prawa. Najbardziej rozpowszechniona liberalna formuła neutralności wymaga, by 
prawo nie faworyzowało ani nie było ufundowane na żadnej partykularnej koncepcji dobra. Biorąc 
pod uwagę formułowaną z różnych stron (zarówno w ramach liberalizmu, jak i poza tym nurtem) 
krytykę liberalnej neutralności, autorzy poszukują alternatywy. Proponowane rozwiązanie to model 
„neutralności jako nie-arbitralności”, zgodnie z którym tworzenie i stosowanie prawa musi poszu-
kiwać równowagi w zbiorze racji uzasadniających stosujących się do tego prawa. Tak pojmowana 
neutralność stanowi przede wszystkim cnotę ustawodawców i sędziów, która pozwala im na wywa-
żenie skonfliktowanych uzasadnień w sposób, który jawi się jako najlepszy w danym przypadku.
Słowa kluczowe: neutralność; uzasadnienie zmiany prawa; liberalizm; ustawodawcy; sędziowie
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